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Cancer is generally considered a low-control situation. Stability of perceptions of control before and after
cancer was examined, as well as the adaptive value of maintenance versus relinquishment of control in
the psychological adjustment to cancer. This study, conducted in the northern Netherlands, was carried
out in a prospective design with four assessment points (one pre-morbid and three post-morbid
assessments) involving semi-structured interviews and self-report questionnaires. Ninety-nine newly
diagnosed cancer patients all aged over 57 years completed all four assessment points. We found that
perceptions of control declined before and after disease, possibly as a consequence of the diagnosis of
cancer. Further, maintenance of control after cancer diagnosis was related to lower levels of psychological
distress 6 and 12 months after diagnosis. These results suggest that maintenance of perceptions of
control is beneficial to the psychological adjustment to cancer.
 2009 Published by Elsevier Ltd.Main text
Perceived control refers to beliefs that important aspects of
one’s life are under one’s control. It can be considered as a learned
expectation that outcomes depend on one’s own choices and
actions (Mirowsky & Ross, 1998; Rotter, 1966). The concept of
perceived control in relation to adjustment to chronic illness has
drawn considerable attention in recent years. There has been some
debate with respect to the question whether perceived control is
beneficial in all situations, or whether it is more adaptive in low-
control situations to relinquish control. The hierarchical structure
of beliefs people have about themselves and the world, as proposed
by Janoff-Bulman (1989), is useful to answer this question. She
argues that maintaining illusions at the level of basic human
assumptions is adaptive, but that lower order beliefs dealing with
more specific domains and interactions should match reality.
Applied to the concept of control, this indicates that control over
life in general should be adaptive regardless of the controllability of
the situation, while specific control perceptions might benchor).
Elsevier Ltd.maladaptive in some situations. Indeed, examining the literature on
perceived control from this perspective shows that a disadvanta-
geous effect of personal control was mostly reported when control
with respect to specific aspects of the disease were examined, such
as the course, symptoms or the cure of the disease (Affleck, Tennen,
Pfeiffer, & Fifield, 1987; Christensen, Turner, & Smith, 1991). On the
other hand, when general perceptions of control were examined,
there is overwhelming evidence that control beliefs are beneficial
when coping with different diseases, including cancer (e.g., Barèz,
Blasco, Fernando-Castro, & Viladrich, 2007, 2009; Bremer, Moore,
Bourbon, Hess, & Bremer, 1997; Henselmans et al., 2009a; Tennen &
Affleck, 2000); and even may have stress-buffering potential
(Helgeson, 1992, 1999; Henselmans, Sanderman, Baas, Smink, &
Ranchor, 2009b; Penninx et al., 1996).
However, most studies assessed the adaptive value of general
perceptions of control for adjustment to disease using a post-
morbid assessment. While their findings do show that, once people
are confronted with disease, general perceptions of control once are
beneficial, they do not answer the question whether maintenance
versus relinquishment of control is more beneficial for adjustment.
Moreover, it is not clear whether pre- to post-morbid changes in
perceived control occur at all. Therefore, in the present prospective
study we will examine the role of general perceptions of control
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cancer is conceptualized as the course of psychological distress
after diagnosis compared to distress before diagnosis. We address
two issues: (1) the stability of perceived control before and after the
diagnosis of cancer and (2) the relation between pre- to post-
morbid changes in control and the course of psychological distress
up to one year after cancer diagnosis, taking into account the pre-
morbid level of cancer.
The diagnosis of cancer can be considered as a low-control
situation (Thompson, Sobolew-Shubin, Galbraith, Schwankovsky, &
Cruzen, 1993). Cancer is a serious life-threatening disease, and its
diagnosis is likely to change patients’ perceptions of control.
Especially in the short term, cancer has its impact on the psycho-
logical well-being of patients, indicating the threat implied by
cancer. Although there have been inconsistent findings, studies
have shown that newly diagnosed patients initially react with an
increase in psychological distress during the first year after diag-
nosis, indicating the stressful nature of cancer (e.g., Epping-Jordan,
Compas, & Osowiecki, 1999; Hinnen et al.,2008; Rodrigue, Behen, &
Tumlin, 1994; Schroevers, Ranchor, & Sanderman, 2006). And
although the prognosis of the cancer may vary across patients, and
consequently, the diagnosis of cancer need not be considered
a low-control situation for patients with a good prognosis, the
life-threatening nature of the disease, the extensive treatment
modalities with uncertain outcomes, and the intrusiveness of the
disease may challenge one’s control perceptions, even in patients
with a good prognosis. In general, there is little that patients can do
to influence the medical course of the disease.
As defined before, perceived control can be considered as
a learned expectation. Positive outcomes reinforce the sense of
control, whereas negative outcomes can have a weakening effect
(Mirowsky & Ross, 1998). In addition, McLeod (2003) has argued
that control perceptions are established in a social context, in
interactions with others. As such, perceived control is not a stable,
trait-like characteristic; instead, it is susceptible to change. Indeed,
several studies have shown that control declines with older age
(e.g., Bailis & Chipperfield, 2002; Chipperfield, Campbell, & Perry,
2004; Kempen et al., 2005; Wolinsky & Stump, 1996), possibly as
a result of an increasing number of confrontations with uncon-
trollable situations, such as death of significant others and own and
other’s diseases. Furthermore, the finding that perceptions of
control vary with educational level, with higher educated having
stronger perceptions of control (Bailis, Segall, Mahon, Chipperfield,
& Dunn, 2001; Mirowsky & Ross, 1998), also indicates the role of
environmental factors in the establishment of perceptions of
control. These findings together suggest that perceptions of control
are changeable due to environmental factors.
On the other hand, there are indications that people are able to
maintain a sense of control, even in the face of uncontrollable
situations. To understand this phenomenon, the two-process
model of perceived control (Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982) is
useful. This model distinguishes between primary and secondary
control. Primary control refers to actual efforts people undertake to
maintain and exert control, while secondary control refers to
cognitive mechanisms individuals apply in order to maintain and
exert control. This model assumes that the desire of primary control
is a basic human need, and that when opportunities to engage in
primary control efforts are diminishing, people resort to secondary
control strategies in order to maintain a sense of control, which
ultimately promotes better adjustment (Heckhausen & Schulz,
1995; Morling & Evered, 2006; Rothbaum et al., 1982; Thompson,
Nanni, & Levine, 1994; Thompson et al., 1993). These mechanisms
include illusory beliefs of control, downgrading one’s expectations,
and application of compensation mechanisms by redirecting one’s
control efforts to other domains than the one that has become lesscontrollable. Thus, applying these cognitive mechanisms may result
in continued high levels of general control perceptions in a low-
control situation like cancer.
Results with respect to changes of control in relation to cancer are
scarce and mixed. A qualitative study of McVey, Madill, and Fielding
(2001) has shown that lowered level of control was the most
commonly reported issue by breast cancer patients before and after
surgery. Quantitative studies corroborate this finding, by reporting
lower levels of control among cancer patients who were assessed at
various points after diagnosis (Ormel et al., 1997; Penninx et al.,
1996) compared to non-patients. On the other hand, in line with
Taylor’s cognitive adaptation theory, in which illusory maintenance
of beliefs is described, Stiegelis et al. (2003) have found that cancer
patients showed greater comparative perceived control after
radiotherapy than a reference group of cancer-free individuals. In
other chronic diseases, Helgeson (1992) and Taylor (1983) have
suggested that disconfirmation of control in case of chronic illness is
only temporary; regaining a sense of control is part of the adjust-
ment to illness. This was confirmed in a study of Henselmans et al.
(2009b), where a temporary decrease in control was found among
breast cancer patients. This pattern was observed only in women
receiving chemotherapy; in other patients perceived control was
stable. To conclude, the evidence regarding the stability of perceived
control in the face of cancer or other chronic illnesses is equivocal.
Studies examining the adaptive value of maintenance of control
are also scarce, because pre-morbid data are virtually lacking.
Hence, we do not know to what extent people with low control
after disease had higher levels of control before disease and how
relinquishing control affects adjustment to cancer or other diseases.
Some evidence is found in qualitative studies of Lowery, Jacobsen,
and DuCette (1993) and McVey et al. (2001) showing that self-
reported loss of general control perceptions after breast cancer
diagnosis and stoma surgery, respectively, were related to poor
psychological adjustment, indicated by levels of depression and
anxiety. Furthermore, evidence for a health protective role of
maintenance of control was provided in a longitudinal study among
elderly, in which maintenance of control was related to a variety of
health outcomes including functional status and overall health.
Although this study did not concern psychological adjustment, the
findings do suggest an adaptive role of maintenance of control.
To examine stability of control and its adaptive value,
a prospective design is needed. In the present study, such a design
was applied in order to examine the adaptive role of general
perceptions of control before and after disease onset in newly
diagnosed cancer patients. First, the course of control perceptions
before and during one year after diagnosis is described, and
compared to the level in a non-patient sample. Although results in
the literature are mixed, we expected that patients would react to
the diagnosis of cancer with a decline in control compared to the
period before because we consider cancer as a low-control situa-
tion. However, we do expect individual differences, i.e., differences
in the extent to which patients show a decrease in control. Second,
the issue of maintenance of control versus relinquishment of
control was addressed by relating change scores in perceived
control before and after disease to psychological functioning in the
mid- and long-term. Based on the literature, we expected that
patients who were able to maintain a sense of control would show
poor psychological functioning. In addition, we tested whether the
relation between changes in perceived control and psychological
adjustment is dependent upon prognosis. Following Christensen
et al. (1991), who used disease severity as a proxy for objective
controllability of the disease, prognosis of the disease was consid-
ered as an indication of the objective opportunities to exert control.
A favourable prognosis would indicate that the diagnosis of cancer
is not an objectively low-control situation per se.
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The present study is part of the Groningen Longitudinal Aging
Study (GLAS). GLAS is a population-based prospective follow-up
study of the determinants of health-related quality of life of older
people, in particular, physical and social disability and well-being
(Arnold et al., 2004; Kempen, Jelicic, & Ormel, 1997). The study
started with a baseline assessment in 1993 and was conducted in
the three northern provinces of the Netherlands, and ethics
approval was given by University Medical Centre Groningen. A
baseline assessment was conducted in a sample of 5279 persons of
57 years and older. The present study used a nested prospective
cohort design of participants who experienced cancer in the five
years post baseline and who consented to take part in a follow-up
study were they to be diagnosed with cancer.Sample
Cancer patients
People in the baseline sample who had given informed consent
to provide medical data to the research team were monitored for
cancer episodes by their general practitioner (GP). All types of
cancer were monitored, with the exception of skin cancer. Four
weeks after diagnosis, patients received a letter from the research
team asking them to participate in the follow-up study, covering
three follow-up assessments at 2, 6 and 12 months after registra-
tion of the disease episode. All eligible patients were approached,
regardless of prognosis.
From baseline onwards, over a period of four years, 332 new
cancer episodes were registered by the GPs. The period between
baseline assessment and diagnosis was variable, ranging from 1 to
60 months (M¼ 29.42; SD¼ 15.28). Additional information could
be collected from medical specialists, GPs and registration of the
Comprehensive Cancer Centre North Netherlands (CCC-NN), which
comprehensively records cancer incidence in Netherlands. These
data confirmed the diagnosis of 216 cases and disconfirmed the
diagnosis of 39 cases (benign or other diagnosis), while the diag-
nosis of 77 cases remained unclear. It was decided to include these
77 cases in the study because the disconfirmation ratio was 15% (39
disconfirmed cases/255 cases from whom medical data were
available). Therefore, the loss of the validly diagnosed patients was
considered much more harmful for the results than the inclusion of
some invalidly diagnosed patients. Thus, 293 cases remained in the
study. Of these remaining 293 cases, 15 had reported at baseline
cancer in the six years prior to the current diagnosis. These patients
were excluded because the prevalence of cancer would interfere
with the analyses. Hence, 278 patients were eligible for the present
study. Of these, 158 participated at T1; another 9 entered the
follow-up study at a later assessment point (total N¼ 167; response
rate¼ 60%). Of the 111 non-participating patients, 23 died before
entering the study while the remaining 88 patients were excluded
from the study because of study procedures (N¼ 39) or because
they refused participation in further assessments during the study
course (N¼ 49; see also Ranchor et al. (2002) for more details).
When participants and non-participants were compared on relevant
baseline variables, the only significant difference between partici-
pants and non-participants was found in pre-morbid level of
perceived control (see next section for the description of the scale),
with the non-participants (M¼ 23.48, SD¼ 5.14) having lower levels
of perceived control than the participants (M¼ 25.29, SD¼ 5.32;
t¼2.54, p< 0.05). The data presented here concern 99 patients
(60% of all participants) who participated at all follow-up assess-
ments. Reasons for T1–T3 dropout were mainly death and poor
health. The dropouts were significantly older (t¼ 3.66, p< 0.001)and included more lung cancer patients (c2¼13.92, p< 0.05). No
differences were found in pre-morbid level of perceived control.
Data collection and procedures
Data were collected through semi-structured interviews con-
ducted at the patients’ homes and self-report questionnaires.
During the interview, we collected sociodemographic data (age,
gender, educational level). Data on perceived control and psycho-
logical distress were collected with self-report questionnaires. Data
on disease stage were retrieved through the Comprehensive Cancer
Centre North Netherlands (CCC-NN). Patients were not paid for
their participation in the study but did receive a small present at
each assessment point.
Perceived control
Perceived control was measured using the Mastery Scale (Pearlin
& Schooler, 1978), translated by the members of the research team
of GLAS (Kempen et al., 1997), which measures the person’s sense
of control over life in general. The Mastery Scale is often used in
the context of chronic illness as a predictor of adjustment. The
scale consists of seven items. A sum index was constructed ranging
from 7 (low perceived control) to 35 (high perceived control).
Cronbach’s alpha of the scale was 0.79. Perceived control was
assessed at all four assessment points. In the analyses, pre-morbid
(T0) levels of perceived control as well as change scores in
perceived control were used as predictors of psychological
adjustment. Change scores from baseline (T0) to T1 were computed
by subtracting the T0-scores from T1-scores; a positive value is
indicative of a gain in control, while a negative value is indicative
of a loss of control.
Psychological distress
We used the concept of general feelings of psychological distress
to assess the outcome of psychological adjustment. The 12-item
version of the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) (Goldberg &
Williams, 1988; Koeter & Ormel, 1991) was used to assess levels of
psychological distress. The sumscore gives an indication of the
severity of psychopathology: the higher the score, the more
psychological distress experienced. Scores ranged from 0 to 36.
Cronbach’s alpha of the scale was high (a¼ 0.89). The GHQ was
assessed at all four measurement points.
Prognosis
For each cancer site in the study, disease stage was converted
into a prognosis score, which covered three categories: poor,
moderate or good. Doing so, an index for disease severity could be
constructed across cancer sites. The data were collected from
Comprehensive Cancer Centre North Netherlands. Not all patients
gave informed consent for collecting medical data, but the data
were available for a subset of the present sample (N¼ 84).
Statistical analyses
Differences between the baseline and follow-up assessments of
perceived control among patients were compared to the baseline
levels of non-patients with one-way ANCOVA, adjusting for age,
gender and educational level. General Linear Model with repeated
measures ANCOVA was used to examine changes in perceived
control and psychological distress over time and the moderating
role of prognosis herein. Effect sizes (Cohen’s d) were computed as
an indication of the magnitude of the changes. Pearson correlation
coefficients were computed to assess the interrelations between
the variables under study. Hierarchical regression analysis was
performed to examine the relation between changes in perceived
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whether the relation between changes in perceived control and
psychological distress was dependent upon the severity of disease,
these multiple regression analyses were repeated with prognosis
and the interaction term of centred scores of perceived control and
prognosis as additional independent variables.
Results
Sample
The sample consisted of 99 patients (57.6% male and 42.4%
female) who could be included in the study at all assessment
points. The average age was 71.8 years (SD¼ 6.5). Seventy-four
percent of the patients had a partner, and the following cancer sites
were found in this group: lung (8.1%), breast (16.2%), prostate
(14.1%), gastro-intestinal (31.1%) urinary (16.1%), other (14.1%). The
distribution of patients over four educational categories was as
follows: I¼ elementary schooling (27.3%); II¼ lower vocational
training (25.3%); III¼ secondary schooling/intermediate vocational
training (32.2%); IV¼ higher vocational training/university (15.2%).
The course of distress
Before answering our main research questions, we first exam-
ined changes in psychological distress in the patient sample (see
Table 1). The means and standard deviations of psychological
distress (GHQ) indicated a significant change over time (F¼ 9.50,
p< 0.001). Post-hoc analyses revealed significant increases in
distress from T0 to all post-diagnosis assessment points (p< 0.05).
In terms of effect sizes, the change between T0 and T1 was modest
while the changes between T0 on the one hand and T2 and T3 on
the other were small. There was a significant decrease in levels of
psychological distress from T1 to T2 and T3, while the change
between T2 and T3 was not significant. The results suggest that at
group level, there was a lasting but small increase in the level of
psychological distress after diagnosis compared to baseline levels,
although there was a decrease after the first period after diagnosis
(T1). The moderately strong correlation coefficients furthermore
indicate individual variability in changes in distress before and after
cancer diagnosis.
Changes in perceived control
In Table 1, mean perceived control scores of the patient group on
all four assessment points are shown as well as the mean score in
the baseline sample. First, we looked at changes over time within
the patient sample. Perceptions of control changed significantlyTable 1
Mean scores (SD) of perceived control and psychological distress at baseline level (T0)






Effect sizes between group comparison 0.18
Effect sizes within patient comparison (T1–T3 versus T0)
Pearson’s correlation T1–T3 with T0 in patients
Psychological distress
Patients 9.55 (4.79)
Effect sizes within patient comparison (T1–T3 versus T0)
Pearson’s correlation T1–T3 with T0
Note: *p< 0.05; **p< 0.01; ***p< 0.001.over time (F¼ 33.25, p< 0.0001). Post-hoc analyses and effect sizes
indicated a medium-sized decrease in perceived control level from
T0 to T1, which continued until T2, resulting in a large difference
compared to T0. From T2 to T3 perceptions of control increased
significantly, although the change from T0 to T3 was still significant
and medium-sized. Thus, compared to the baseline level, perceived
control scores of the group decreased at follow-up. The sizes of the
correlation coefficients, which were only moderately strong,
suggest that changes also took place at the individual level. Further
examination of individual changes revealed that only four patients
(4%) showed a meaningful increase (SD> 0.5) in perceptions of
control after diagnosis. Other patients either showed stable levels
of control (48%) or a decrease in control (48%).
Because the decreased perceived control levels in the patient
group could be due to the aging process, the levels of perceived
control of the patient sample at the various assessment points were
tested against the baseline level of people without cancer in the
original sample. People newly diagnosed with cancer (N¼ 278) and
people who previously had had cancer (N¼ 182) were excluded.
This resulted in a reference sample of N¼ 4819 people, with a mean
age of 69.4 (SD¼ 7.0), of whom 56.8% were female. Apart from
gender and educational level, the results were corrected for age at
the time the particular assessment was analyzed. This means that
at baseline, the results were adjusted for age at baseline assess-
ment, whereas at follow-up, age at the time of the diagnosis was
used to adjust. By doing so, we could correct for possible aging
effects, which was needed given the four-year patient inclusion.
Analysis of variance showed that patients and non-patients did not
differ significantly at baseline, whereas during follow-up, the levels
of perceived control in the patient group were significantly lower
than in the baseline sample. At T1 and T3, the differences could be
considered as small, whereas at T2, the difference was medium-
sized.
Finally, to examine whether the time interval influenced the
changes in control, we tested whether there were different mean
change scores between these groups: patients for whom the period
between T0 and diagnosis was shorter than a year, those who had
a time period between 1 and 3 years and those with a time interval
longer than three years. There were no significant differences
between these groups in mean change score, indicating that the
magnitude of change was not dependent upon the time between T0
and diagnosis.
Although these results cannot be considered as a firm test of
changes in perceived control as a consequence of the diagnosis of
cancer, they do suggest that the levels of perceived control in the
patient group decreased, probably as a consequence of the
diagnosis. Therefore, we decided to use the change scores as an
indication of loss of control.for patients and non-patients and follow-up assessments for patients; statistics for
.
T1 T2 T3









Correlations between sociodemographic variables, perceived control T0–T3 and GHQ T0–T3 (N¼ 86).
Control T0 Control T1 Control T2 Control T3 Control T0–T1 GHQ T0 GHQ T1 GHQ T2 GHQ T3
Age 0.27** 0.11 0.23* 0.15 0.21* 0.13 0.22* 0.14 0.01
Sex 0.11 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.23* 0.13 0.19*
Education 0.29** 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.39*** 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.21*
Control T0 0.67*** 0.38*** 0.22* 0.28* 0.24**
Control T1 0.34** 0.32** 0.30** 0.25*
Control T2 0.04 0.26* 0.18
Control T3 0.08 0.43***
Control T0–T1 0.04 0.03 0.04
Prognosis 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.01 0.04 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.04
Note: *p< 0.05; **p< 0.01; ***p< 0.001.
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Table 2 shows Pearson correlation coefficients of the interrela-
tions between the variables in the study. More perceived control
was moderately strongly associated with less psychological
distress, with the cross-sectional correlations being the strongest.
When the relation between prognosis on the one hand with
psychological distress, perceived control scores and T0–T1 changes
in perceived control on the other were computed for the subset of
84 patients, none of these turned out to be significant. The socio-
demographic variables showed significant correlations with
distress at T1 and T3. As to perceived control, older age showed less
perceived control at T0 and T2, and with less change in perceived
control. A higher educational level was moderately strongly
associated with more pre-morbid perceived control, but not with
post-morbid perceived control. In addition, a higher education was
significantly associated with a larger decrease in perceived control.
Changes in perceived control in relation to adjustment
In Table 3, the change in perceived control scores for pre- to
post-diagnosis were evaluated in relation to psychological distress
6 and 12 months after diagnosis. Besides the corrections for age,
sex, educational level and pre-morbid GHQ, the results were also
adjusted for pre-morbid perceived control. The reason for doing so
was that changes in perceived control are dependent upon the
actual perceived control level at T0. The beta-coefficients indicate
that at T2 lower levels of pre-morbid perceived control and
a greater reduction in perceived control were both predictive of
distress. At T3, only the change score was significantly predictive of
the level of distress. These results are different from the bivariate
associations and can be ascribed to the entry of the baseline level of
perceived control in the analysis. Apparently, reduction in
perceived control in itself is not of significance for psychological
adjustment but only in combination with the previous perceived
control level. In order to test whether the time interval between
baseline assessment and T1 affected the results, we repeated theTable 3
Standardized regression coefficients (ß) for change scores in perceived control
(T0–T1) with GHQ at T2 and T3 as the dependent variables, adjusted for age, sex, and
educational level; changes in variance and cumulative variance explained.
GHQ T2 GHQ T3
ß R2-change ß R2-change
Age 0.16 0.04
Sex 0.04 0.07
Educational level 0.14 0.05 0.18 0.05
GHQ T0 0.23** 0.08** 0.32** 0.10**
Control T0 0.41** 0.03 0.26 0.02
Control T0–T1 0.34* 0.06* 0.33* 0.06*
Cum. R2 0.22 0.21
Note: * p< 0.05; **p< 0.01; ***p< 0.001.analysis with entry of the time period between T0 and cancer
diagnosis as an additional variable in the multiple regression
analysis. Doing so did not change the results; the standardized
regression coefficient for time period was only b¼ 0.07 (ns).
Entering prognosis in the analyses did not change the pattern of
results. The regression coefficients of prognosis were b¼0.04 and
b¼ 0.04 for distress at T2 and T3, respectively, whereas the afore-
mentioned observations for pre-morbid control and the change
score remained valid. The interaction term of prognosis and
changes in perceived control was not significant.
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to examine the stability of
perceived control before and after cancer and the adaptive value of
changes in control for adjustment to cancer. The results indicate
that individuals showed a decline in perceived control before and
after diagnosis of cancer. Furthermore, this decline in control
turned out to be maladaptive: those who were not able to maintain
control after diagnosis were worse off 6 and 12 months after
diagnosis in terms of psychological distress. These results were
found irrespective of prognosis of the disease.
The finding that perceived control changed after the diagnosis of
cancer is in line with our expectations. After diagnosis, there was
a sharp decrease in level of perceived control. One year after
diagnosis, patients seemed to recover with respect to their level of
perceived control, although it was still lower than in a random
sample of non-cancer patients of the same age and in comparison
to their own level of perceived control before the diagnosis. In
addition, the correlation coefficients suggest that there is individual
variation in stability of perceived control. Changes in perceived
control were largely independent of the prognosis of the disease, as
was suggested by the low correlation between prognosis on the one
hand and changes in perceived control on the other. The whole
pattern of results, including the temporary decrease in control in
the patient group and the comparison with the baseline sample,
seem to suggest that the observed changes might be the results of
the diagnosis of cancer. The lack of a control group as well as the
variable time period between baseline assessment and T1-
assessment do not permit firm conclusions, however. Changes in
perceived control could be the result of other causes that are not
known to us. However, assuming that the changes in perceived
control are a result of the diagnosis of cancer, it remains unclear
whether they are caused by the confrontation with an event over
which no control could be exerted (i.e., the diagnosis of cancer), by
the limited possibilities to exert control the consequences of the
event (e.g., treatment choices, stressful medical procedures, lasting
side effects including pain and fatigue, unattainability of important
life goals) or by a lack of opportunities to control the course of the
disease. These three different causes cannot be distinguished with
our data set.
A.V. Ranchor et al. / Social Science & Medicine 70 (2010) 1825–18311830Furthermore, the results concerning decreases in perceived
control as an independent predictor of adjustment during the first
year after diagnosis suggest that maintenance of control is more
beneficial than relinquishment of control, even in a low-control
situation. The finding that the beneficial role of maintenance of
perceived control was established independent of disease prognosis
lend further support. However, the lack of moderation by prognosis
might be because it is not an appropriate proxy for objective
controllability. Prognosis captures only one specific aspect of the
disease, i.e., its course, which is only one of the many aspects
patients are confronted with when they receive the diagnosis of
cancer. People might focus on a variety of other disease-related
aspects rather than on their prognosis, consequently weakening its
use as a proxy for objective controllability. Therefore, the findings
with respect to the role of prognosis should be interpreted with
caution.
In order to understand the beneficial role of maintenance of
control before and after diagnosis in a low-control situation, the
concept of secondary control is useful (Chipperfield et al., 2004).
Maintenance of control might be the result of cognitive mecha-
nisms people resort to, the so-called secondary control strategies.
Several of these potentially adaptive cognitive mechanisms have
been identified in the literature, including positive illusions and
revaluing other aspects of life. Of these mechanisms, the adaptive
value of positive illusions has been extensively studied in the
literature. Laboratory studies have indicated that, in general, illu-
sory control relates to better well-being (Thompson, 1999;
Thompson, Armstrong, & Thomas, 1998). These findings pertain to
the short term only, long-term findings are generally lacking.
Additional support for the illusory mechanism was found in the
work of researchers examining Taylor’s (1983) cognitive adaptation
theory (e.g., Stiegelis et al., 2003).
However, we cannot preclude the possibility that maintenance
of control was the result of primary control efforts. As indicated
previously, when people receive the diagnosis of cancer, they are
confronted with a variety of disease-related aspects, some of which
are still controllable. For example, patients may maintain control by
actively exerting control through engagement in treatment choices.
In a similar vein, people may exert control over other domains in
life, for example, work or spare time, thus compensating for the loss
of control they experience with respect to their disease. Loss of
control over one aspect of the disease, for example, its prognosis,
can also be compensated by exerting control over aspects related to
the disease process. Thompson et al. (1993) have reported that
compensation of loss of control in one domain was related to better
adjustment to cancer, specifically when control was exerted over
other aspects of the disease process. Henselmans et al. (2009a)
found that engagement in social activities mediated the relation
between perceived control as measured with the Mastery Scale and
well-being. In addition, Carstensen, Hanson, and Freund (1995)
showed a relation between perceived control and the application of
compensation strategies. Thus, the benefits of control maintenance
may be the result of active efforts to exert control, which in turn
may result in better psychological functioning. It should be
mentioned that although we discuss here behavioral compensation
mechanisms, there are also cognitive compensation mechanisms,
such as revaluing other domains in life, which could be considered
as a type of secondary control.
In the present study, we have only evaluated the extent to which
patients maintain control and not so much the mechanisms that are
used to maintain control and that might explain its adaptive value.
Future research should aim at disentangling the two types of
control (primary and secondary) potentially involved in mainte-
nance of control and examining the adaptive value of these two
types of control. Identifying the specific mechanisms underlyingchange or maintenance of control is of both theoretical and clinical
relevance, especially when the adaptive value of these mechanisms
is considered. In clinical practice, perceived control is an important
variable in psychosocial interventions for cancer patients and other
patient groups, implicitly or explicitly. The clinical implication of
our findings is that it is important for patients to maintain or regain
a sense of control, even in situations where there are few oppor-
tunities to exert control. In order to promote this, it is important to
identify the mechanisms underlying maintenance of control.
The study has a few strengths and limitations that need to be
acknowledged. The response data suggest a non-response rate of
40% when the sample in the present study is compared to the
original eligible patient group. An explanation for this non-
response rate is that, unlike other studies in this field, we were able
to cover all incident cases in a selected sample, including those with
a poor prognosis. It is likely that this produced the seemingly high
non-response rates. Many longitudinal studies make restrictions
with respect to the prognosis of patients by including only patients
who are likely to survive during the study period. One reason for
non-response was poor physical or psychological health. This
brings us to another issue that needs further attention, i.e., the
selective dropout in the study. As the data show, non-participants
had lower levels of control compared to participants. There were no
significant differences for level of distress, even if patients indicated
that they did not participate because of poor psychological health.
The fact that non-participants had lower levels of control might
have affected our findings. People low on control are less likely to
show changes in control. Therefore, the selective dropout might
have resulted in a possible overestimation of changes in control in
our study. Eventually, this may result in an overestimation of the
relation between changes in control and course of distress. It is
likely that maintenance of low control is related to high distress
rather than to low distress, while in the present study we found
that maintenance of control was related to low distress, perhaps
because of the dropout of people low on control.
Furthermore, the validity of the pre-morbid assessment of
perceived control may be questioned, given the variable time
interval between pre-morbid assessment and diagnosis. Other
events may have occurred, which may be responsible for the
changes in control and distress. In addition, the magnitude of
change in perceived control may vary with the time interval.
Examination of these issues indicated that time between baseline
assessment and cancer diagnosis did not change the present
results. It was related neither to the magnitude of change nor to the
course of distress. Therefore, the baseline assessment seems to be
a valid pre-morbid assessment, despite the four years to diagnosis.
Even then, the lack of a control group precludes causal inferences
between cancer onset and changes in control. These changes might
well be the result of natural ageing, as has been documented by
Welch and West (1995), although we did find significant differ-
ences between control levels in the patients compared to the level
in the baseline sample of elderly, and we did find an increase in the
patient group between 6 and 12 months after diagnosis.
Despite these methodological limitations of the study, we
believe that the present study, with its unique prospective design,
adds valuable insights about the stability of perceived control and
its relation to disease adjustment. This is important because the
literature shows that as a group patients adapt fairly well, while at
the same time there are individual differences in adjustment.References
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